Objective
An analysis similar to the analysis performed by RBMK Consortium for the 3rd generation reactors (Ignalina-Smolensk III) was to be performed on 1st and 2nd generation reactors.
The objective in more detail was:

• Review the safety of older units, looking at the differences between the generations and the safety enhancement achieved by other safety improvements implemented or planned at each reactor;
• Make recommendations concerning safety improvements, to be agreed by both Western and Eastern parties involved.

Where agreement was not possible, the disagreement was to be recorded.
Scope of the work:
1. Continuation of First Phase Review
Task 1.1 Flooding and Explosion Hazards
Identification of flooding and explosion risks and review of protection measures in place and the risk of consequential damage to equipment which may lead to a nuclear hazard.
Task 1.2 In-Service Inspection
Comparison of the procedures and techniques used for ISI of steam and feed systems with those used for the primary system.
Task 1.3 Code Verification and Validation
Judgement on the verification and validation of the key codes used for RBMK safety analysis.
2. Earlier Generation Units
Task 2.1 Configuration and Evaluation of Safety Systems
Detailed review of safety systems at reference plants and recommendations on priorities for remedial and other safety improvement work at the stations.
Task 2.2 Analysis of Specific Events
Gaining insights into the RBMK system, its operation and safety management, transferring the techniques of root cause analysis and incident investigation as a means of safety improvement.
Task 2.3 Implementation of Safety Management
Review of safety management comparing the implementation of safety management philosophy and practices with current management as expressed, i.e. in IAEA guidelines and standards.
Task 2.4 Quality Systems
Extension of the Phase-1 review to two new reference plants and other aspects of plant operation.
Task 2.5 Maintenance and In-Service Inspections
Comparison of methods used on 1st and 2nd generation units with those on the most recent plants.
Task 2.6 Fire Protection
Extension of the Phase-1 review to two new reference plants; fire as a potential common cause initiator.
Task 2.7 Graphite - Pressure Tube Interaction
Review of the measurement techniques used for the monitoring of the graphite-pressure tube gaps.
Task 2.8 Multiple Pressure Tube Rupture (MPTR)/ Cavity Overpressure Protection
Main Issues: the possibility of events that might lead to multiple tube rupture and the capacity of the cavity overpressure protection system.
Task 2.9 Final Report
Result
This project was one of the systematic attempts to identify possible initiators of Multiple Pressure Tube Rupture (MPTR), to review present MPTR analyses, to evaluate the present lines of defence against MPTR and to propose complementary actions.
Even if it has not been possible to treat all the complex MPTR fields in depth due to manpower and time limitations, the established final report formed a basis for better understanding the problems and gives valuable information for further rectifying the efforts in improving RBMK safety to be addressed in future Tacis Projects.