Project Description

1 Introduction

Kalinin NPP is situated in the north of Tver region, on the southern shore of Lake Udomlia, 125 km away from Tver city, 330 km from Moscow and 400 km from St. Petersburg. The plant has three VVER-1000 reactors (1000 MW each). Units 1 and 2 are VVER-1000 model V338, an early non-standard model (so-called 'small series' by the IAEA). These units were connected to the grid in May 1984 and December 1986. Unit 3, a standard VVER-1000 model V320, was connected to the grid in December 2004. The electricity of Kalinin NPP is transmitted to eight regions via two 330KV and four 750KV lines.

2 Background

The On-Site Assistance (OSA) programmes are a corner stone of the Tacis nuclear safety co-operation with the Russian Federation. Companies or consortia with experience of NPP operation in the EU are contracted by the EC to work on site at a nuclear power plant of the Beneficiary country. The aims are to provide the transfer of know-how, in particular through soft assistance, which addresses the human element of safety (i.e. safety culture, quality assurance, maintenance, management and training,…) and to upgrade the safety of the plant through the supply of equipment. Through the Tacis programme, OSA projects were implemented at seven NPPs in Russia (Kola, Balakovo, Kalinin, Leningrad, Smolensk, Beloyarsk and Novovoronezh).

3 Objectives

The aim of the On-Site Assistance programme at Kalinin NPP was to combine the experience of the OSA Consultant with the experience and needs of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operator in order to:

• improve the operational safety of the Kalinin NPP through the transfer of know-how and operational best practice;
• implement safety related specific projects which include the tendering and procurement of equipment required to improve the safety of the power plant.

This contract was a direct continuation of the previous contract for OSA to Kalinin NPP (R1.03/02). The activities to be implemented were organised under three general areas:

General Operational Assistance

• General management and coordination of the contract
• Support and advice to the NPP in licensing problems
• Exchange of experience on NPP management or modernisation, including short term training
• Experience feedback on completed Tacis projects

Soft On-Site Assistance

• Human Factor Approach in the frame of Safety Culture:
  At Tihange NPP, a human factors approach in the feedback of operational experience had been developed in the frame of the enhancement of safety culture. The goal of the present project was to share with Kalinin NPP the experience gained at Tihange NPP in order to give the KNPP team the possibility to adapt this approach to the Russian culture, with the aim of improving safety culture. Significant achievements were made in the previous OSA contract (R1.03/02) in establishing a Human Factors Unit at Kalinin NPP along with the working practices and methodologies. This work continued under the present contract.
• Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG):
  Support to Kalinin NPP in order to facilitate the development of a specific strategy and a Handbook for Severe Accident Management for Unit 3 (similar to what was prepared for Units 1 & 2 in the previous OSA contract, R1.03/02).
• Development of methodology and training program for Risk Evaluation Approach in preparation of any work at KNPP.
  Such a methodology has been developed at Belgian NPPs and the goal is to adapt this methodology to the specifics of KNPP. A training program will be established in order to disseminate to all concerned workers a methodology that is aimed at developing an interrogative attitude for all workers of the NPP.
• Exchange of other operational experience and good practices based on the Global Safety Plan of Belgian NPPs, according to areas selected with KNPP.

Hard On-Site Assistance

Continued implementation of the Plant Improvement Project

• Assist in the continuing contract management of the 2 the two parts of the PIP:
  • Supply of a new KTZ (Protection System of the Reactor Coolant System, Turbine and Feedwater pumps) for Unit 1 & 2 of KNPP,
  • Supply of a Computerized Information / Safety Panel (CI/SP) System for Unit 1,
• including follow-up of manufacturing and factory tests, documentation approval, licensing support, delivery & customs clearance, assistance during installation, site testing & commissioning, follow-up of the warranty period, etc.

4 Project Results – Achievements (With reference to the TOR)

General Operational Assistance

The General On-Site Assistance was performed in accordance with the requirements of the contract.
The OSA Consultant organised several workshops in Belgium and at Kalinin NPP to inform Kalinin NPP specialists on the Belgian practices and experience in each of the following topics:

• Modification Management:
  Updated information was provided as a follow-up of the Workshops organised under the previous OSA contract (R1.03/02). Examples of recently completed or ongoing modifications at Tihange NPP were presented along with information about all the important aspects that have to be taken into consideration.
• Use of Alarm Sheets:
  This was a follow-up to the seminar held under the previous OSA contract and allowed KNPP specialists to see the use of Alarm Sheets during an exercise of an operating team in a training session on the full scope simulator at Tihange NPP, in particular the redirection from Alarm Sheet to particular incident procedures could be observed.
• Power uprates and extension of fuel cycles
  The objective was to provide information to KNPP specialists on the experience gained in Belgium about the safety related problems linked to power uprate and extension of the fuel cycle, the way these issues have been managed at Belgian NPPs and about all the important aspects that have to be considered before starting any activity in these areas.
• Other workshops and training sessions were organised to provide information on the implementation of the following at Belgian NPPs:
  • Reliability centred maintenance and maintenance management
  • Plant Life Management
  • Periodic Safety Review
  • Inspection practices
  • Instrumentation and Control systems

Soft On-Site Assistance

Severe accident management guidelines (SAMG)

In the framework of the operational safety activities of the previous contracts for OSA to Kalinin NPP, the OSA Consultant and the End-User had collaborated on the topic of Severe Accident Management Guidelines for Kalinin NPP and had prepared a first Handbook for Severe Accident Management for Units 1 & 2 of Kalinin NPP.

For the present contract, it was intended to support Kalinin NPP in order to facilitate the development of a specific strategy and a Handbook for Severe Accident Management for Unit 3 of the NPP. The work of this task also included the development of a MELCOR model for Unit 3 to allow modelling of the progression of selected severe accident scenarios.

With a regular dialogue between the OSA Consultant and the End User, OSA Consultant experts prepared a draft version of the handbook, which was completed following review and comments by KNPP, taking into account the data specific to Unit 3 of the plant. The final completed handbook has been approved by KNPP.

Similarly, the MELCOR model was adapted to take into account the specific design data related to Unit 3. Validation of the model was performed with input from the OSA Consultant and KNPP specialists.

In addition to the above Handbook for SAM and MELCOR model for Unit 3, other outputs of the work performed on severe accident management at Kalinin NPP in the framework of this and previous contracts implemented by the OSA Consultant are:

A strategy document for the development of severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs)

• A handbook for severe accident management for Units 1 & 2.
• Training of Russian experts for writing SAM Guidelines.
• draft example SAM Guideline.

Whilst the original intention to prepare a full set of SAM Guidelines for Kalinin Units 1 & 2 could not be achieved for technical reasons, and the project had to be adapted during its implementation, the platform has been established for Kalinin NPP to continue this activity alone.

Human Factor Approach in the frame of Safety Culture

At Tihange NPP, a human factors approach in the feedback of operational experience has been developed in the frame of the enhancement of safety culture. This approach gives the operator or worker an important role in safety improvement, but it also recognizes the possibility for human error. The goal is to provide the opportunity to all personnel to declare any mistakes or dangerous situations experienced, in order to allow a trained team to perform a detailed analysis, in collaboration with the initiator, and to disseminate and feed back the lessons learned. Such an approach needs a fundamental change in the assessment of human behaviour and in the attitudes of personnel. It is also necessary to develop a working environment in which personnel feel free to declare these kinds of incidents without fear of recriminations. The approach must therefore be organized with the complete support of the top management, on a step by step basis.

The aim of the present project was to adapt the Human Factor approach developed at Tihange and to introduce this approach at Kalinin NPP by implementing an 'event' reporting and in-depth analysis system that takes into account human factors.

The work involved:

• The transfer of competencies and experience acquired at Tihange NPP, taking into account the required adaptation to the local constraints and specifics of the local culture,
• Setting-up a local HF Unit or expertise centre,
• eveloping a local HF Network to disseminate and feed back the HF experience.

The work was implemented by a team of specialists from the OSA Consultant and experts from KNPP. Ownership and active participation was sought throughout the project from the Plant Director and Chief Engineer and technical support for the implementation was provided by the laboratory of Psycho-Physiological Sciences of the Training Centre of KNPP. The work was closely coordinated with the similar project implemented by the same OSA Consultant at South Ukraine NPP, which also allowed experience exchanges between the KNPP, SUNPP and OSA Consultant experts.

Significant advances in the implementation of this project were made in the previous contract (R1.03/02). The work continued under the present contract, but the objectives were limited to OSA Consultant review of the work of KNPP and provision of further coaching to consolidate what has already been implemented in order to progressively ensure full autonomy of the KNPP HF Unit. This would provide the necessary expertise to the KNPP HF Unit to continue the approach across the site and would also provide the platform from which the approach could be implemented at other Russian NPPs.

At the end of the contract the objectives can be considered to have been achieved, and this has resulted in sustainable benefits in nuclear safety for Kalinin NPP, as well as other Russian NPPs if and when the Beneficiary implements the approach at its other NPPs.

Development of methodology and training program for Risk Evaluation Approach in preparation of any work at KNPP.

Through presentations, workshops and training sessions, the approach and methodology adopted at Belgian NPPs for the evaluation of risk associated with any intervention work at the power plant has been shared with Kalinin NPP specialists. In particular, a practical training was organised for six engineers of various departments of KNPP at the mock-up of Tihange NPP during which the KNPP experts:

• were given detailed information about the way Risk Analysis is managed in work preparation at Tihange NPP.
• were given the possibility to proceed with the practical implementation of this Risk Analysis methodology on a simple work to be performed at the mock-up of Tihange NPP.
• visited Unit 1 of Tihange NPP, which was under maintenance outage, in order to see how this Risk Analysis methodology is applied at the plant.

Hard On-Site Assistance

Concerning the two parts of the PIP project, R1.03/02 A (KTZ for unit 1 & 2) and R1.03/02 B (CIS for Unit 1), the call for tender, tender evaluation and contracting were successfully performed in the frame of the previous OSA contracts.

• R1.03/02A: KTZ (Protection System of the Reactor Coolant System, Turbine and Feedwater pumps) for Unit 1 & 2. During the previous contract the first of 3 sub-systems of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) protection was installed and put into operation at both units (1 & 2) and the other RCS protection systems as well as the Turbine & Turbine driven Feedwater Pumps (T&TFP) protection system were manufactured and tested at the factory. Under the present contract the remaining systems were installed as follows:
  • The two remaining sub-systems of the RCS protection for Unit 2 were installed, tested and put into operation during the outage of July/August 2008.
  • The T&TFP protection system for Unit 1 was installed, tested and put into operation during the outage of September/October 2008.
  • The T&TFP protection system for Unit 2 was installed, tested and put into operation during the outage of July/August 2009.
  • The two remaining sub-systems of the RCS protection for Unit 1 were installed, tested and put into operation during the outage of September/October 2009.
• At the end of the present contract, the project was completed with the exception of the warranty period.
• R1.03/02B: CIS/SPDS for Unit 1. This project suffered several delays during implementation. At the start of the present contract, the manufacturing, documentation approval and licensing stages were still ongoing. Factory Acceptance Testing was carried out over a period of several months and was finally completed successfully in summer 2009, which allowed delivery of the equipment in time for installation, site testing and commissioning during the Unit 1 outage of September/October 2009. At the end of the present contract, the project was completed with the exception of the warranty period.

Further Information

On-Site Assistance to Kalinin NPP was discontinued after the end of the present contract due to the fact that Russia did not wish to be a Beneficiary of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.